In West Africa—where the Harmattan wind scatters truths and lies with equal indifference—the Nigeria Armed Forces has finally become the thing we feared it would become: a swollen giant drunk on its own shadow, convinced that its footprints across the continent are benevolent simply because they are large. This is the tragedy of Nigeria—not its size, but its certainty that size is virtue.
Like the overfed patriarch in a French village who confuses his own appetite for destiny, the Nigerian military waddles across borders, half in the name of democracy, half in the name of forgotten debts to its European handlers, and half in the name of a glory it no longer possesses. Yes, too many halves. But that is the mathematics of postcolonial delusion.
Last Saturday night, Lt. Col. Pascal Tigri and his junior officers in Benin staged their revolt, claiming by dawn that they had toppled yet another French-groomed president. Before the ghosts of the night could whisper whether the coup was successful, legitimate, misguided, remedial, or merely chaotic, Nigeria swooped in—fighter jets, bombs, and all—like a colonial oracle desperate to fulfill a prophecy no one asked it to deliver.
The apologists will say: “But Nigeria was invited!” They always return to this line like a child clutching at the only blanket left in the village.
Let us pre-empt them.
A government under siege, fragmented, contested, or trembling under the force of an armed revolt cannot “invite” foreign intervention with legal legitimacy. Consent in international law is not granted by a frightened president hiding behind trembling curtains. Consent must come from a government with effective control. Benin did not have that.
But the critics will insist: “Nigeria was simply protecting democracy!” Of course. And the fox was simply protecting the henhouse.
To them, we respond:
Democracy is not protected by bombs. It is not restored by foreign fighter jets. It is not anointed by ECOWAS statements drafted in back rooms scented with French perfume and Nigerian arrogance. No legal regime—neither UN Charter, AU Constitutive Act, nor the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol—permits unilateral action by a single state pretending to speak for an entire region. ECOWAS intervention must be collective, deliberated, authorized, and proportionate. Nigeria did none of these. Instead, it acted as if its appetite was a sufficient mandate.
But the historically shallow critics will also say: “Nigeria has a noble tradition of restoring order in Africa!” Ah yes, the fiction of noble intervention—written by nostalgic diplomats who forget their own archives.
Let us remind them.
I. Tanganyika, 1964 — When Legality Shielded Nigeria
Nigeria was invited by Julius Nyerere only after an OAU emergency summit. It acted under multilateral authority. This was intervention governed by continental consensus, not Nigerian whim. Comparing this to Benin is like comparing a marriage proposal to a home invasion.
II. São Tomé and Príncipe, 2003 — The Practice Bombing Run
Obasanjo threatened the coup leaders, sent jets to shake their windows, and violated São Toméan airspace without authorization. It was illegal. But he did not drop bombs. At least he spared Africa that disgrace.
Tinubu cannot boast the same restraint.
III. Benin — The Historic Crossing of a Line
Tinubu has done what no Nigerian president before him dared: He has bombed a neighboring African state.
And he did it under the whispering guidance of Emmanuel Macron—a man clinging to a 5% approval rating in France while still clutching the ghost of Francafrique with the desperation of a drowning man holding onto a rusted anchor.
This is not “democracy.” This is the reanimation of colonial hunger.
France lost Niger. It lost Mali. It lost Burkina Faso. Three pillars of Sahelian revolt. So now it clings to Benin—the only remaining coastal corridor preventing the Sahel Alliance from breaking its final chain. Nigeria has agreed to be the enforcer, the bouncer, the big black body guarding French interests. The Magical Negro of international relations, solving problems abroad while drowning in domestic dysfunction.
But the shallow analysts will insist: “But Ghana and Sierra Leone supported the operation!” Support is not authorization. Cheerleading is not legality. Two failing democracies shouting “Go, Nigeria, go!” does not transform an illegal act into a lawful one.
If Ghana’s or Sierra Leone’s approval could legalize an invasion, then a taxi union endorsement could amend a constitution.
The Legal, Moral, and Historical Truth
Nigeria acted: Without ECOWAS authorization, without AU consultation, without UN Security Council mandate, without lawful consent from a government in effective control, without self-defense grounds, without proportionality, and without legitimacy
It crossed a border and dropped bombs to determine another African country’s political future. In law, we do not call this “intervention.” We call it invasion.
And in the long memory of African history—in the rain-soaked folktales recited by griots, in the bitterness of postcolonial scars—Nigeria’s name will be recited not as savior, but as mercenary.
Tinubu now stands where Obasanjo hesitated, where Abacha bluffed, where previous leaders stopped short: He is the first Nigerian president to transform regional swagger into outright aggression.
In this sense, Nigeria’s invasion was not just illegal—it was inevitable. It was the fulfillment of a long, ugly apprenticeship under colonial mentors. A chronicle of militarism foretold. And Africa, having seen this plot too many times, names it for what it is: Nigeria has committed an unlawful invasion of the Republic of Benin.
It’s called R2P, responsibility to protect. I believe it’s that they working with.
Kojo Sossah Under the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (paras. 138–139), which codifies R2P: States have the responsibility to protect their populations.
If a state fails, the international community may act—but only through the UN Security Council, under Chapter VII.
No state may unilaterally invoke R2P to justify military force.
This is reaffirmed in multiple UN General Assembly debates on R2P (2009, 2012, 2018): R2P interventions must be authorized by the Security Council.
R2P is not a self-help doctrine. It is not a license for powerful states to march their militaries across borders even under humane pretexts.
Tinubu the drug lord.
ECOWAS needs to be disbanded. This idea of a military force dominated by Nigeria to be used at will to invade this or that nation on the whims and caprices of some diktat must be demolished before it turned into a monster that will cost unnecessary lives to control. Nigeria is fast becoming the Colonial Force in West Africa. It cannot solve its own problems, like Boko Haram, but can invade neighbors. It is a nonsense!
Has the government of Benin charged Nigeria of invading their air space?
Jonas Paga Bu They have not. Neither has the government of Benin invited them. Both information are as far as we know from the reports. I am not sure. Although suffice it to say that under international law, the UN Charter (Art. 2(4)), the ICJ’s jurisprudence, and state practice—the lack of a formal charge or protest by the invaded state does not legalize an unlawful use of force by another state.
Jonas Paga Bu Thanks very much for your question 🙋
Narmer Amenuti My point is you are not privy to the communication between Benin and the ECOWAS States that intervened. It is not like they held a press conference first before implementing the military strikes.
Furthermore, according to the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance intervention is permitted explicitly in the following cases:
Unconstitutional change of government
Coup d’état
Refusal to hand over power after elections
Member states signed away absolute sovereignty in such cases.
Jonas Paga Bu Great point, my brother! ECOWAS member states may have signed portions of their sovereignty away to the organization, but even so, the UN Charter ultimately prevails.
I disagree with your interpretation, and even if ECOWAS itself were to authorize enforcement action, regional bodies cannot override the UN Charter. Article 53 of the UN Charter is explicit: no enforcement action may be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council.
ECOWAS may condemn a coup. ECOWAS may deliberate, mobilize, or prepare a mission. But the use of force requires Security Council authorization—unless the host state consents.
During a political crisis, when leadership is contested or a head of state has been deposed, determining who can validly give consent becomes a matter of legal dispute.
My specific point, however, is that Nigeria acted unilaterally. It is now part of French geopolitical statecraft to reframe this unilateral action as something broader or more legitimate. Hence the sudden narrative that Ghana and Sierra Leone “supported” or “assisted” the operation. These two unstable governments do nothing to improve Nigeria’s legal position.
A single ECOWAS member state acting on its own does not satisfy any condition under the ECOWAS Protocol. The Protocol empowers ECOWAS institutions—not individual member states—to authorize collective intervention. That means: if a coup occurs, no individual ECOWAS country may simply cross a border and “restore order.” ECOWAS has the following structures for a reason:
a Commission,
a Mediation and Security Council,
a Defence and Security Commission,
a standby force,
formal voting and authorization procedures,
reporting obligations to both the African Union and the United Nations.
Nigeria acting alone is not ECOWAS acting.
Article 1(c) of the 2001 Protocol reaffirms respect for territorial integrity and state sovereignty. This is instructive: the Protocol condemns unconstitutional changes of government, but it does not dissolve the territorial rights of the affected state, nor does it authorize unilateral military actions by neighboring countries.
What I want to insist on in short: the ECOWAS Protocol is not a blank cheque for individual states to wage cross-border military operations, and nothing in that document supersedes the requirements of the UN Charter.
Narmer Amenuti I think you have answered your own query. In your reference to the UN charter you left the caveat: UNLESS the host state consents. That was and is my point when I state you are not privy to the communication that took place between Benin, Nigeria and ECOWAS. This is why I asked if Benin has charged Nigeria with airspace violation. So to assume, just because there wasn’t public information available prior to the military intervention, that it equals NO consent from Benin is jumping the gun big time.
At worst, you can say IF there was no prior consent from Benin then Nigeria and ECOWAS violated UN protocol. But to state explicitly that Nigeria invaded Benin is a premature statement if you ask me.
Jonas Paga Bu I think we have reached some common ground. I agree that we are not privy to all the operative intelligence. My contention, however, is that Nigeria is being positioned—deliberately, in the same way that it was against Niger—to skirt serious legal boundaries in order to appear as though its intervention were lawful.
It is true that a legitimate government may, in principle, invite foreign military assistance. But this point obscures the core issue: legitimacy is neither automatic nor indefinitely presumed. When a government has collapsed, fled the capital, or lost effective control over the instruments of state authority, its purported “consent” no longer carries legal validity. A foreign state intervening “on behalf” of such a government cannot claim a lawful basis for its actions; it is operating without a competent sovereign counterpart.
This raises a critical factual and legal question: At what precise point did Nigeria intervene? The available reports suggest an unusually swift response. How was such immediacy possible? And on whose authority was it justified?
Under international law, for consent to constitute a lawful basis for military intervention, it must be free, voluntary, and issued by an authority exercising effective control over the state. Consent given under duress, under military coercion (for example, if Beninese forces compelled the outgoing president to “invite” Nigeria), under foreign pressure (such as from France), or under conditions approximating foreign occupation, is legally invalid. This principle is well established in the ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda), where the Court held that consent extracted under coercive or compromised circumstances is no consent at all.
On this basis, I am concerned that the actions of France (which we now understand that there we calls between Macron, 5% approval in France and Tinubu) and Nigeria in Benin may fall outside the bounds of lawful intervention.
Accordingly, Nigeria—or any ECOWAS state—cannot rely on “consent” that evaporates the moment the inviting government ceases to function as an effective authority. Nigeria (or France) conducted airstrikes, as reported, which makes the legal threshold even more stringent. Once a government is deposed, has relinquished territorial control, or can no longer command the organs of state, its capacity to invite foreign forces terminates. Any continued military involvement beyond that point constitutes an intervention without valid consent and is therefore presumptively unlawful under international law.
Narmer Amenuti Firstly, a government can’t “flee”. When a President travels abroad on official duty is the government machinery said to be travelling as well?
Secondly, legitimacy emanates from the people as enshrined in the constitution. Under what legitimacy were the coup makers acting? If you postulate that legitimacy had left the elected government at the time, how would you justify that it had RIGHTLY been conferred on the coup makers and not Mr. X walking the streets of Benin? What process was activated to confer it on the coup makers and not ,say, ECOWAS or Nigeria? Where is this purported process documented so that we don’t rely on personal idiosyncrasies of people?
Jonas Paga Bu Yes—and I shall quote you verbatim—I “postulate that legitimacy had left the elected government at the time.” Therefore, the actions of Nigeria (and France), including the bombing of one faction and the resulting civilian deaths, are unquestionably illegitimate under international law. What occurred, in effect, was an invasion undertaken to support one internal actor against another.
Such a determination of winners and losers in an internal political struggle does not rest with ECOWAS, nor with any individual member state, nor with Nigeria acting as France’s proxy. It rests exclusively with the domestic parties engaged in their own contest for authority (with Mr. X, his supporters and his opposition).
Once the government’s legitimacy had evaporated—once it no longer exercised effective control—no external actor possessed lawful grounds to intervene militarily on its behalf. Any such intervention, particularly one involving aerial bombardment, constitutes the unlawful use of force in violation of the UN Charter, the ICJ’s jurisprudence on consent, and the foundational principle of non-intervention.
Narmer Amenuti Well, those are your personal musings on the matter. They aren’t shared by Benin, Ecowas, AU or the UN. There is a reason why States operate based on codified laws so that we can be spared the capricious thoughts of interested or disinterested parties. There are laid down rules for legitimacy determination and coups aren’t one of them. I can’t simply hold the President for 10 mins in a lavatory and announce transfer of legitimacy as a result. That’s a sure recipe for chaos and mayhem.
What’s the purpose of legitimacy If it can evaporate by simply announcing on public TV a new president and government? Have the people of Benin agreed that the powers they conferred on the president can be dissolved so flimsily?
Jonas Paga Bu This is not a debate about “capricious thoughts.” It is a debate about the limits of state consent—limits that international law has defined precisely to prevent the very danger you identify: powerful states (such as Nigeria or France) manufacturing pretexts to use force in weaker states like Benin.
Your objection misunderstands the doctrine of effective control in public international law and conflates popular mandate with internationally cognizable authority. The issue is not whether I personally believe legitimacy “evaporates,” nor whether a faction can simply declare itself government by seizing a television studio. The question is whether a government continues to meet the legal threshold of effectiveness required for its consent to validate foreign military intervention. That is not speculation; it is settled doctrine.
International law—including the practice of the UN, AU, and ECOWAS—draws a firm distinction between: (1) Normative legitimacy (who ought to govern, based on elections or constitutional processes), and (2) Empirical effectiveness (who actually controls territory, institutions, communications, and armed forces).
This distinction is articulated clearly in the ICJ’s Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) and reflected across decades of state practice: consent becomes legally ineffective once the inviting authority ceases to exercise sufficient control to bind the state. At that point, no state—however friendly—may rely on “consent” to justify military action.
Speculation about invitations “behind closed doors” is irrelevant. What matters is the observable and legally cognizable fact that, at the time of Nigeria’s intervention, the government in Benin no longer demonstrated the attributes of effective authority. They lost power even if for 10 minutes. And what is equally clear, given prior threats by Nigeria and France to use force against a sovereign state (Niger), is that both states have relied on manufactured pretexts to intervene in Benin at will. Under international law, such an intervention is presumptively unlawful.
None of this is capricious. It is foundational to the modern law of state sovereignty and foreign intervention.
Narmer Amenuti The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), through its Special Representative Leonardo Santos Simão, strongly condemned the attempted coup in Benin, describing it as a serious threat to national stability, a grave violation of the Constitution, and a breach of the rule of law. UNOWAS welcomed reports that the attempt had been foiled and called for an immediate return to calm.
Separately, UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed deep concern over the attempted unconstitutional seizure of power and unequivocally condemned any action undermining democratic governance in Benin. He emphasized the need for full respect for the Constitution and the rule of law.
The United Nations affirmed its solidarity with the government and people of Benin and reiterated its commitment to supporting the restoration and preservation of democratic stability and constitutional order.
Can you provide any evidence that the international organizations side with your point of view?
Jonas Paga Bu You are changing goal posts. But I will indulge your kindness.
UN condemnation of a coup does not constitute authorization for foreign military intervention, nor does it resolve the legal question of whether “consent” from an embattled government is valid. UN press statements are not Security Council resolutions, authorizations under Chapter VII, ICJ opinions, or international legal determinations on state consent. They are diplomatic communications intended to promote calm, not adjudicate legality.
In other words. The UN, AU, and ECOWAS routinely condemn coups. Such condemnation is political speech, not a legal determination empowering any state—Nigeria or anyone else—to deploy force.
Your question—Can you show any example where international organizations take your view?—is answered easily: yes.
The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has repeatedly held that: Condemnation of a coup does not validate military intervention; Consent given by a collapsing or coercively constrained government is not legally effective; Foreign force used without valid consent is unlawful, regardless of the political sympathy enjoyed by the inviting authority.
These principles are affirmed across multiple ICJ cases and UN-recognized jurisprudence, including DRC v. Uganda (ICJ, 2005), Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ, 1986), as well as UN Security Council deliberations on Sierra Leone / ECOMOG, and the international handling of Yemen, Haiti, and The Gambia, where recognition of a government did not automatically legitimize foreign armed intervention.
Narmer Amenuti A foundational ICJ principle is:
“An illegal situation cannot produce lawful rights.”
You can’t acquire something illegally and transform it into a lawful possession. Provide the quotes from the ICJ that buttress the claims you make about legitimacy, consent and coup d’etat.
Narmer Amenuti The ICJ has criteria for accepting invitation for foreign military intervention:
1. The invitation must come from a legitimate, internationally recognized government.
2. It must be freely given, without coercion.
It cannot be used to: suppress popular self-determination undermine neutrality in civil conflicts support an unconstitutional regime
Respecting these rules ensures interventions remain lawful, ethical, and internationally recognized. Do you have evidence that what ECOWAS and Nigeria did violated these stipulations?
Jonas Paga Bu The fact-sensitive caveat the Court repeatedly applies is this: consent is only legally effective if it is given by an authority that actually possesses effective control and if it is given freely (not under duress). That is not a mere gloss — it is the test the ICJ uses to determine whether a purported invitation can lawfully justify foreign force.
The legal burden to prove lawful consent lies with the party relying on it (here, ECOWAS/Nigeria). Where the facts show collapse, flight, coercion, or immediate foreign military action, the presumption flips: the intervenor must prove valid, free, contemporaneous consent from an authority capable of binding the state.
If Nigeria/ECOWAS assert that intervention was by invitation, international law requires them to produce evidence: written request(s), contemporaneous communications, ministerial minutes, the identity and capacity of the official who invited, and proof that the government exercised effective control at that time. Do you have those documents to share? Absent that proof, the claim of lawful consent is legally weak.
Narmer Amenuti You keep rehashing the same line about “consent” and “coercion” and I keep asking you if you possess evidence that Nigeria and ECOWAS flouted either two?
Secondly, there is no legal burden placed on ECOWAS or Nigeria because there are NO formal ACCUSATIONS in any recognized legal platform. Who is charging them? Why should they provide evidence in the absence of any charges? Can you point to any formal complaint against these actors?
Jonas Paga Bu Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the use of force is presumptively illegal. Emphasis on “presumptively”. This is my point. When the Charter presumptively prohibits force, Nigeria must provide evidence of a valid legal basis. It has not. (You may provide it if Nigeria has given it to you).
In addition, international law does not operate like domestic criminal law. An act violating the UN Charter is illegal from the moment it is committed, not from the moment someone files a complaint. The absence of a tribunal filing does not convert an illegal use of force into a legal one. International law is not silent simply because no one has sued.
You ask me to “bring evidence” of coercion. That reverses the law. I gave the example that The ICJ in DRC v. Uganda (2005) stated: Consent cannot be presumed.
You also claim “ECOWAS has no legal burden.” This is false. ECOWAS cannot legalize a unilateral Nigerian invasion. Only the Security Council can. Even if ECOWAS “approved” (it did not, unless ECOWAS has given it to you), the action remains unlawful without UN authorization (Nigeria does not have it, and they can’t be trusted to share that with you).
To be clear, I think you overlook these core principles of international law:
(1) The use of force is illegal unless proven lawful.
(2) States must justify intervention; critics need not disprove it.
(3) No formal complaint is needed for an act to be illegal.
(4) Regional bodies cannot override the UN Charter.
(5) Consent must be proven by the intervener, not assumed by the audience.
In an analogous domestic law, Nigeria is “presumptively” criminal. Nigeria’s burden is to prove legality. It has not met that burden. Therefore, the Presumption of illegality stands.
Narmer Amenuti In international law, a sovereign government can legally invite foreign military help. This isn’t directly from UN Article 2(4), but comes from the principles of state sovereignty and consent.
If a legally recognized government requests assistance, foreign forces are acting with permission and it doesn’t violate Article 2(4).
Key points:
1. Consent of the recognized government (customary international law)
2. UN Charter rules, like collective action under Chapter VII
Narmer Amenuti Let me add that when a legally recognized government invites foreign troops to help remove coup plotters, it’s legal under international law. This is based on sovereignty and consent, not Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Some examples:
Comoros (1995): French troops helped restore President Djohar after a coup attempt.
Sierra Leone (1997–98): ECOWAS and UN forces helped return President Kabbah to power.
Gambia (2017): ECOWAS troops supported President Barrow after Jammeh refused to step down.
Jonas Paga Bu The dispute is not about your point that “In international law, a sovereign government can legally invite foreign military help.” You oversimplify the doctrine of consent and ignore all three of the legal limits the ICJ, UNSC, and state practice have repeatedly imposed.
The past cases you have cherry-picked and mischaracterized do NOT support uncontrolled “invitation power” and in fact prove the opposite.
(1) Comoros (1995)
French intervention was not endorsed by the UN, and is widely regarded as questionable under international law. It is absolutely not a governing precedent. Most scholarship calls it “legally dubious.”
(2) Sierra Leone (1997–1998)
ECOWAS did NOT intervene on the basis of consent from a collapsing government.
Their action was justified through: UN Security Council resolutions supporting ECOMOG, Effective authority being regained by Kabbah from exile under a legal mandate
This case strengthened the doctrine that consent must be attached to effective control, not simply “recognition.”
(3) The Gambia (2017)
ECOWAS troops did not intervene because of a coup. They intervened because: The democratically elected president (Barrow) was already inaugurated, the incumbent refused to step down, UN Security Council Resolution 2337 explicitly backed ECOWAS diplomatic efforts. This was NOT a case of “inviting foreign troops to remove coup plotters.” There was no coup at all. It was a post-election standoff.
None of these examples resemble Benin.
Narmer Amenuti You are oversimplifying issues. The examples I provided show clear cases of a government, even when it had lost control over areas in the country, being able to invite foreign military assistance WITHOUT the UN.
Are you suggesting that Under NATOs article 5 member states have to seek UN permission to intervene in case of an attack on a member state? Of course not. We know what happened in The Gambia in the 80s. When a leftist coup attempt erupted in The Gambia in July 1981 while President Dawda Jawara was out of the country, he flew to Dakar (Senegal) and formally requested military assistance.
Senegal responded — deploying paratroopers and other forces to Banjul. Their intervention, in conjunction with loyal Gambian forces, crushed the coup by early August.
The case remains a textbook example of a legitimate government leveraging a pre‑existing defense pact (a 1965 mutual‑defense agreement between Gambia and Senegal) to invite foreign troops against internal rebels.
I insist that your case does not reflect actual reality on the ground
International law is not anthropology. It is not the study of “what states do by force.” International law is concerned with rules, not patterns of violation. My argument may not in your cases reflect that reality on the ground. A crime neither reflects the law nor does it invalidate it.
Quite the opposite, it validates that the law has been broken. States, just like people, do illegal things all the time. And they may go unpunished. They intervene without authorization constantly. But that never makes it legally valid. When I was 11 years of age, I got away with driving under the influence and without a license in Nigeria. I won’t say which town! That does not make DUI or underage driving or driving without a license the reality on the ground, and for that matter a precedent at law.
The cases you have cited are all contested. Therefore they are not settled, they are not precedents.
Both Senegal and The Gambia carefully framed the 1981 coup as “externally supported” — to fit the treaty. (Can we agree on that fact or you still disgree?) It was a political fiction, but one required to avoid illegality.
Moreover, the legality was disputed internationally — and never endorsed by the ICJ or the UN. You are citing contested political history, not settled law.
You are appealing to fallacies such as:
“reality on the ground”
“actual practice”
“what states do”
But state practice is irrelevant when the ICJ has clearly defined the law. ICJ doctrine supersedes questionable regional practice.
Now, for the NATO case. NATO Article 5 applies only to external armed attacks, not internal coups. Nobody needs UN permission to repel a foreign invasion. A coup is not a foreign invasion. This comparison is NOT legally analogous. That is why Senegal-Gambia had to pretend the 1981 coup was “externally supported.”
Nigeria cannot “INVADE” but rogue soldiers can steal power or interrupt a democratic process? Let’s stop sounding as if the military is the panacea to our problems. That’s backward looking. These are POWER THIEVES WHO DESERVE NO MERCY.
A standing army we understand was drawn from several West African countries while Nigeria is specifically reported to have sent in fighter jets. Yes they share a border…so why not assist maintain the democratic order…
Kingsley Gbeho Nye bro, why can’t they? Yes, “rogue” soldiers can do whatever they want in their country. And they are to face whatever consequences within their country. Another country/state has no rights or jurisdiction to punish “rogue” soldiers in another state. What on earth are you promoting?
Under International Law, any Armed Entry by a Foreign State is an “Invasion.” Whether the intention is benevolent, malicious, democratic, or chaotic is irrelevant.
Kingsley Gbeho You are moralizing? You are not chopping your wife well so I deserve to come and chop her well for you? After all, she consents! You need to take your argument to its final conclusion to become aware of its ridiculousness.
Narmer Amenuti a legitimate government can ask another state for assistance when under attack. What is so complicated about that?
Julian Ashun Of course it is complicated! A legitimate government can invite foreign military assistance. But, you miss the point. Legitimacy is not automatic. If the government has collapsed, fled, or lost control of the capital, its “consent” may be invalid. Another state moving in swiftly to restore a deposed government is illegitimate! The invitation must be free, voluntary, and not coerced. If a government “invites” help while under: duress, military blackmail, occupation, then the consent is invalid. This is from the ICJ Armed Activities on Congo case. Nigeria cannot intervene after the inviting government ceases to exist. Once the government falls, consent evaporates.
Narmer Amenuti But Tanzania overrun Uganda during Amin too!!!! This is not my concern too much but my dilemma is couldn’t this provide enough grounds for another country to move in to carry out a coup in a neighbor’s country and install whoever it likes and set up it’s own government?
US and France are good at it!!!
So Boko Haram is prospering in Nigeria and they can invade Benin?
Kwabena Sultan Kekeli Say it aloud! The obvious ridiculousness of the irony warrants a very close judgement.
ECOWAS IS A SYNONYM FOR NEO COLONIAL PUPPET INSTITUTION, CIA / NATO, AFRICOM, FRANCE, THE WEST, THE UNITED SNAKES OF AMERICA DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS, THE ILLEGAL IMMORAL TERRORIST ZIONIST STATE OF ISRAEL, THE MILITARY PRISON POLICE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX DBA AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM (THE ENEMY).
THE SAME EVIL CAPITALIST AND NEO COLONIAL PUPPET MOTHERFUCKERS WITH THOUSANDS OF STRATEGIES AND TACTICS, PATHOLOGICAL LIES, TRICKS, GAMES AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE TO INVADE, COLONIZE AND LOOT OUR RICH AFRICAN MINERAL RESOURCES.
POLITICALLY BACKWARD, POLITICALLY UNEDUCATED, POLITICALLY UNCONSCIOUS, INCOMPETENT, COWARDLY, UNCLE TOM, SELLOUT, NEO COLONIAL PUPPET HOUSE NIGGA AFRICAN PRESIDENTS, PRIME MINISTERS, KINGS, CLERGYMEN, MISSIONARIES AND MERCENARIES ARE GUILTY OF AIDING AND ABETTING.
It’s sad Nigeria is interfering in the internal affairs of fellow African Country Benin because of Protecting Democracy. But how is the life standards of Nigerians first before the intervention in Benin.? Africa needs developments and creating jobs to the people.It’s the needs of the people which is paramount first, the people vote for you to address the challenges of the people not stooges or puppets of foreign Countries. Today in Africa the citizens are suffering and the governments must address those challenges not just protecting democracy for no reason just to create class society.
Really!, smh. I very much hope you have misreported. What happens if Trump invaded Nigeria. Can she call upon its neighbours for support?